Since the 1990's, developing countries have privatized their manufacturing and banking sectors. As a result, a substantially larger share of external debt has been contracted by the private sector. We examine the effects on bank loan prices as a result of this major change in the international debt markets. We find that, in general, the private sector's external debts negatively affect the price of bank loans. Yet this impact is mitigated by the presence of potential market distortions, due to, for example, fixed foreign exchange regimes that the private sector may benefit from, but which also can exacerbate any potential negative aspect. Even so, as a general rule, the private sector's external debts promote financial stability. Adequate market conditions, however, should be implemented to prevent potential market distortions. JEL: F34; G32
Introduction
Since the 1990's, developing countries have privatized their manufacturing and banking sectors. As a result, in many countries, there has been a boom not only in the amount of foreign currency-denominated debt (external debt, hereafter) contracted by the private sector, but also in the share of the private sector's external debt in the total amount of external debt. For instance, the outstanding long-term external debt of Brazil's private sector increased from less than 10% of all outstanding long-term external debt in 1990 to almost 60% in 2007. Yet we have very little knowledge of the impact of such a major change in the international debt markets.
Greater access of the private sector to external debt markets can be viewed as a stabilizing factor, because funds may be used more efficiently. Recent experience, however, suggests that private sector external debt can also become a source of financial instability. For instance, until 1997, Korea's private sector borrowed excessively in the international market to take advantage of lower euro-currency interest rates, while the Korean currency was supposedly pegged to the U.S. dollar. 1 1 "In the 1990s, (...) the stock of foreign debt began to rise more quickly, as (...) the country's banks and chaebol [borrowed] heavily abroad (…). The distortions on the domestic market, where long-term finance was comparatively difficult to raise-and where interest rates were kept higher than marketclearing levels-together with the remaining controls on capital flows, encouraged South Korean companies, especially banks, to borrow short-term abroad, to fund long-term investment." EIU, 1999; p. 36. The 2008 financial crisis in Iceland followed a similar pattern. 2 In both cases, the governments had conducted very sound fiscal policies, making the ensuing external debt crises unforeseeable. Also, in both cases, the governments nationalized insolvent firms and banks, together with their related debts. This suggests that, for a number of reasons, government handling of external borrowing could improve efficiency.
Therefore, the impact of private sector external debt on global financial stability is unclear.
This paper examines the effects of private sector external debt on the country's financial stability. To our knowledge, this paper presents the first analysis of such effects. More precisely, we look at the impact of the size of private sector external debts' outstanding amounts on interest spreads charged by banks.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide evidence that the private sector holding a larger share of a country's total external debt results in a negative impact on interest spreads charged in external debts. The second contribution is that, while the former may be true, such an impact is mitigated in the presence of potential market distortions, due to, for example, a fixed foreign exchange regime. The findings provide evidence that the private sector can function as a factor of financial stability in international debt markets, in general, though not in all circumstances. These 2 "With a high nominal policy rate, many companies have sought funding from abroad (where rates are lower) and foreign-denominated loans to individuals also increased rapidly from 2004 to mid-2007 mid- ." EIU, 2008 p. 15. results may have important policy implications for privatization efforts in developing countries.
External debts contracted by the private sector may promote financial stability for three reasons. First, privately owned borrowers, in particular banks, promote efficiency in the use of funds (e.g., Bonin et al., 2005; Iannotta et al., 2007; Megginson, 2005) . In general, state-owned firms and banks have been found to create conflicts of interest with politicians and to be less efficient, due to poor management governance (e.g., Boubakri et al., 2008; Djankov, Murrell, 2002) . 3 Second, creditors' monitoring power is stronger whenever loans are contracted by private firms, rather than by state or public entities. In fact, states benefit from legal immunity (sovereignty), resulting in weak liquidation threat credibility and enforcement power (e.g., Eaton, Fernandez, 1995; Eaton, Gersovitz, 1981) . This is not the case with private borrowers. 4 Enhanced monitoring improves cost and amount efficiencies of loan contracting. Third, the renegotiation of debts is facilitated by local bankruptcy courts. Sovereign debt renegotiation suffers from the lack of a coordination device between lenders that prevents orderly workouts. Despite such a lack, coordination among lenders is a factor of efficiency and stability (e.g., Bolton, Scharfstein, 1996; Brunner, Krahnen, 2008; Morris, Shin, 2004; ) . Therefore, the substitution of public sector debtors with private sector debtors is likely to help resolve noticeable imperfections in external debt markets.
3 Yet recent work offers support to the importance of political connections. See Francis et al., 2009. 4 Notice that the monitoring power of creditors still varies in function of national creditor rights and enforcement power. See, e.g., Esty and Megginson, 2003; La Porta et al., 2008. External debts contracted by the private sector may also promote financial instability for two reasons. First, the private sector may choose to issue external debts, so as to take advantage of distortions in interest rate and currency markets. This is particularly true in the presence of currency pegs (e.g., Calvo and Mishkin, 2003) . The cases of South Korea and Iceland in which similar patterns could be discerned were described above. Second, general financial distress in the presence of multiple lenders may lead to inefficient workouts, due to complex renegotiations and the liquidation of otherwise viable projects (Morris, Shin, 2004) . The coordination provided by official authorities helps prevent such inefficient outcomes (Kasahara, 2009) . A similar impact may be expected in the presence of multiple borrowers. One form of coordination of borrowers is the intervention of the government by way of, for example, partial or full ownership of the distressed firms. State ownership provides creditors with a unique renegotiator counterparty, thus allowing for more rapid settlements. This paper chiefly relates to the literature on international debt crises and international financial stability. We examine whether private sector debts promote financial stability as compared with the public sector debts. By examining the impact of the external debt to the private sector on the price of bank loans, we analyze the interaction between private and public sectors' external debts. The closest analysis to ours is seen in Arteta and Hale (2008) , who found that following a sovereign default, loan amounts to the private sector are substantially reduced. Our findings suggest that private sector external debts reduce the risks associated with both the country and the price of external debt, yet such debts may be a factor of greater instability in the presence of potential market distortions.
The paper also relates to the impact of the financing of the private sector on the country's performance. Hauner (2009) found that banks' financing of private firms promote the efficiency of the banking sector. Even so, Klein and Olivei (2008) showed that the capital account liberalization has a limited impact on financial depth. Our findings suggest that the access of the private sector to external debts decreases the risk associated with the country.
Last, the paper relates to the literature on financial development and growth.
Among others, Bonin et al. (2005) and Hasan et al. (2009) found that privatization and the financing of the private sector has a positive impact on the country's banking sector efficiency. Beck et al. (2006) showed that developed financial intermediaries do not have an impact on growth volatility in developing countries. Our analysis is similar, as we look at the share of the private sector in external debts rather than domestic debts. We find that private sector external debt is a factor of growth and financial stability. One explanation is that banks are enabled to exert their monitoring skills on private sector borrowers.
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section presents the empirical methodology and the data; Section 3 presents the results; Section 4, the robustness analysis; and Section 5, the conclusion.
Empirical Methodology and Data

The Empirical Model
We focus our analysis on the impact on the bank loans' interest spreads of the share of the private sector in the country's total external debt. The major challenge of such an analysis is to ensure that the latter would not capture other factors, for example, openness and size of the private sector in domestic credit. Therefore, we need to control for all other related indicators. The model is as follows.
Log(Interest Spread) =
Share of Private Sector in External Debt
Share of Private Sector in External Debt AND Fixed Foreign Exchange Regime
Share of Private Sector in Domestic Debt
Government Size
Macroeconomic Environment External Debt Burden
(1)
Economic and Political Stability Other Country Indicators International Credit Markets Conditions Loan and Borrower Characteristics
Appendix A defines all of the variables and cites data sources. Consistent with previous literature on international debt pricing, the dependent variable is the logarithm of the interest spread (e.g., Eichengreen and Mody, 2000; Hallak, 2009 ). We are aware that our model is subject to significant multi-collinearity concerns.
Private Sector External Debts and Fixed Foreign Exchange Regime
The key indicator in Model (1) We construct the interaction variable dFixed_Regime * External_Private/Total.
This interaction variable reports the share of the private sector external debts if the country is under fixed foreign exchange regime, zero otherwise. By doing so, we control for potential market distortions, due to fixed foreign exchange regimes.
Domestic Financing of the Private Sector
In addition to the above, we need to control for the private sector size in the domestic credit market. We measure the latter with Domestic_Private/Total, the amount of domestic credit to the private sector relative to the total domestic debts. A second explanatory variable controls for the size of the government, Government Size.
This is aimed at controlling whether the effect of external debt variables that we may find stems from the size of the private sector, in general.
Hauner (2009) showed that a larger share of the private sector in the total domestic credit promotes the efficiency of the financial sector. Notice that Levine et al. (2000) and Klein and Olivei (2008) , among others, interpreted the size of private sector domestic credit relative to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as an indicator of financial depth. To some extent, Domestic_Private/Total may capture a similar effect.
Either of the two interpretations implies a negative impact of Domestic_Private/Total
on the interest spreads of bank loans.
Other Explanatory Variables
Other explanatory variables are standard macroeconomic and debt indicators used, for instance, in Arteta and Hale (2008) , Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) The country's Macroeconomic Environment includes Investment, the national investment share of GDP; Openness, the sum of exports and imports relative to GDP;
and Inflation, the consumption price index's annual growth rate. Notice that these variables may also create substantial multi-collinearity problems in our model estimate. For instance, previous research has highlighted a causal relationship between openness and macroeconomic variables, such as government size and capital flows (e.g., Alesina an dWacziarg, 1998; Cavallo and Frankel, 2008; Ram, 2009; Rodrick, 1998) .
External Debt Burden is proxied by two variables. The long-term repayment ability of the country is proxied by the total amount of external debts to Gross National Product (GNP), External Debt/GNP. The short-term repayment ability (probability of liquidity shortages) is proxied by the ratio of total debt services to exports of goods and services, Debt Service/Exports.
Economic and Political Stability is measured by Political Stability, the number of years since the most recent political regime change, as defined in Polity IV Project, (Marshall, 2007) Institutional Investor has published twice per year, in March and September, the highly regarded credit rating of almost all countries that tap international debt markets. The rating is a score between zero and 100, with 100 representing the least chance of default. The rating is based on a bankers' survey whereby scores are weighted by institutions' assets. Notice that we applied the March rating for the months January-June of the same year and the October rating for the months JulyDecember.
Other Country Indicators include Real XR Appreciation, Credit Rating Residuals,
and English Legal Origin. Real XR Appreciation is the three-year appreciation of the real effective exchange rate. We used Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) data, because it provided more complete information than other sources, in particular than the IMF International Financial Statistics. Note that we had to remove three loans from Angola in 1996 and 1997, because the real exchange rate appreciations were exceptionally high in this period.
Because countries may have specific risk factors, we are tempted to control for idiosyncratic country effect by including country dummies. Yet some countries are minimally represented, and the number of dummies would be relatively large.
Instead, we employed a more sophisticated method similar to the one employed by Esty and Megginson (2003 loans that we obtained, we keep loans that are denominated in U.S. dollars only in order to maintain a certain degree of homogeneity in the data, while bearing a relatively small data loss. Excluding for non-U.S.-dollar loans, the sample includes 10,221 loans.
Of these 10,221 loans, we selected floating-rate loans that report the interest spread and whose basis rate is LIBOR. We also removed "Islamic financing" and "Co- 
Results and Analysis
Model (1) is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Estimates results are reported in Table 3 .
The Impact of External Debts to the Private Sector on the Price of Bank Loans
External_Private/Total, the share of the private sector's outstanding long-term external debts, relative to all outstanding long-term external debts, has a significant negative impact on the bank loans' interest spreads. Therefore, banks view a larger share of the private sector in a country's external debts as a factor of financial stability. 9 In a previous version of this paper, we included the mean real growth in the previous five years, yet the variable seemed to create substantial concerns in our estimates. This is consistent with the previous literature on economic growth (e.g., Durlauf et al., 2005; Levine et al., 2000) .
Robustness Analysis
Outliers Analysis
We examine the residuals and the outliers. We first conducted a robustness analysis using the methodology developed by Hamilton (1991) . 11 The results are reported in Table 4 . The results are unchanged.
Column (f) in Table 4 reports the results without the main outliers. We used standard approaches of outlier selection based on Studentized errors and leverage ratios (see, e.g., Belsley et al., 2004) . The results obviously provide with substantially larger R-squares. Interestingly, the ratio of the domestic credit market to the private sector to total domestic credit turns out to have a negative impact on the interest spread. This is consistent with, for example, Hauner (2009) ; yet the impact of the private sector's external debt is unchanged.
Explanatory Variables
Because we were unsure whether the variables we constructed fit our estimate, we used several variables with other indicators and data sources. Among others, we replaced the short-term debt burden indicator (probability of liquidity shortages) with the ratio of international reserves to exports of goods and services. We used the Penn World Tables for the country's openness (Code: OPENC). We replaced the free rate with the U.S. Treasury rate instead of LIBOR. Our results are unchanged.
11 In practice, we used the Stata robust regression function whose methodology is based on the methodology suggested by Hamilton (1991) .
Moreover, to ensure that the interaction variable did not actually capture the impact of the presence of a fixed foreign exchange regime instead of the interaction, we added dFixed_Regime, the dummy variable that takes the value 1, if the country had implemented a fixed foreign exchange regime. We had no idea a priori of the impact of this factor. The estimate results of the share of the private sector in external debt are unchanged.
Year and Industry Effects
The Credit Rating Residuals were aimed at capturing any factors that were not in our model, including time and idiosyncratic effects. We also controlled for government and financial borrowers. Yet we ensured that there was no specific effect that we missed in our results by estimating the same model taking account for all year and industry effects (on top of Government and Financials). Columns (b) and (c) of Table 4 report the estimates of Model (1), including, respectively, year and industry dummies. 12 The results are unchanged. Therefore, the results are relatively solid. The main conclusion that the share of the private sector in external debts negatively affects the price of bank loans remains valid.
Country Effects
Because loans contracted by Chinese borrowers represent about 17% of the sample, we had major concerns that China would actually be driving our results.
Therefore, we estimated our model minus loans contracted by Chinese borrowers.
Also, we noticed that Latvia and Kazakhstan often came up among our outliers.
Therefore, we ran similar tests excluding these two countries. Results are reported in Table 4 , Columns (c) and (d). All of our estimates provided similar results 13 ; namely, a larger share of private sector external debt has a negative impact on the interest spread of bank loans, yet the presence of a fixed exchange rate mitigates this impact.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we examine the impact of the share of the private sector in a country's external debts on the interest spread charged in international bank loans. In recent years, the private sector has substantially increased its share in the external debts of developing economies. The effect of such a major occurrence on financial stability remains widely unknown.
The results show that, in general, banks view a larger share of the private sector in a country's external debts as a positive signal about that country. The impact, however, is mitigated in the presence of potential market distortions introduced by, for example, fixed foreign exchange regimes. Thus, the private sector improves the stability of international debt markets. Despite that, the private sector exacerbates The analysis has important policy implications. In fact, findings show that promoting privatization together with a reduction in capital controls improves the country's cost of debts and financial stability. Thus, the privatization process seems to set developing countries in the right direction. This is consistent with, for example, Bonin et al. (2005) and Hasan et al. (2009) . Yet such a choice may turn out to be counter-productive if official authorities also introduce market distortions, due to, for example, inadequate fixed foreign exchange regimes. This is consistent with recent economic events, such as those that were experienced in South Korea and Iceland. 
